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The Role of Oil in Kuwait's Economy
by Steve Anderson
After an Anglo-Persian geologist by the
name of P.T. Cox produced the first evidence
of oil in 1931, Kuwait would never be the same
again. The whole structure of Kuwait,
ec onomically and politically, chang ed
dramatically. Kuwait developed from a poor
Middle Eastern country to one of the richest
countries in the world. The population went
from poor pearl divers and fis hermen to some
of the most powerful oil barons in the world.
This paper will show the transformation of a
poverty stricken country into a petroleum
giant.

Background
Kuwait was founded in the 18th century by
migrating herders. In 1899, Great Britain
assumed control of Kuwait's foreign affairs
and, following an outbreak of war with the Ottomans in 1914, established a protectorate over
Kuwait. In 1961, Kuwait received its independence and, in 1963, was admitted to the
United Nations. Kuwait is located on the coast
of the Persian Gul f, which is in the heart of
the Middle East petroleum basin. The total
population of Ku wait, as of the 1985 census,
was 1,709,857; the population per square mile
was approximately 231 people (Hall 1983, p.
179). The dominant language is Arabic, and
the dominant religion is Sunni Muslim.
Kuwait's climate and landscape create ideal
conditions for the extraction of petroleum.
T he landscape is generally flat, broken by occasional low hills. Elevations range from sea
level to 1000 feet above sea level (Winstone
1972, p. 12). Generally, the landscape consists
of desert and desert basins called " playas?'
The climate is semitropical tempered by the
warm waters of the Persian Gulf.
In the pre-oil era, the fishing economy of
Kuwait provided the most important occupation for the working class. The daily surplus

of fis h was dried, salted and transported to the
interior but never developed into a regular export industry. At its peak in 1963, pearl industry exports reached $714,286 (Al-Sabah
1980, p. 16). The industry, however, was
organized around a system of debt. Advances
were given out and then became liabilities
against the crew, thus insuring subsistence level
wages and no turnover in labor. The conditions were similar to those experienced by the
sharecroppers of the southern U nited States
during the 1930s depression.
In the 1950s and 1960s the shipping industry
was fruitful fo r Kuwait because of its central
location in the Persian Gulf. Kuwait was also
the main ship builder in the Persian Gulf in
the 1950s, producing an average o f 50 to 60
ships annually (Al-Sabah 1980, p. 23). The
villages supplied all the vegetables needed, but
Kuwait imported all of its grain and other
agricultural needs. Thus, despite the absence
of unemployment in the pre-oil era, the people of Kuwait were poor.

Kuwait's Post-Oil Economy
In the post-oil era Kuwait's economy
became dualistic, consisting of the oil sector
and the non-oil sector. From 1963 to 1968, the
a nnual growth rate of GNP was a relatively
high 8.8 percent (Al-Sabah 1980, p. 81). Most
of the growth was attributed to the rapid
development of the oil industry and the influx
of immigrants. The 8.8 percent rise in GNP
was thought to be very large at that time, but
in the period 1968 to 1976, it was overshadowed by a booming 12 percent annual growth rate
(Al-Sabah 1980, p. 81). The 12 percent annual
growth rate was attributed to increasing posted
prices in the crude oil and liquified petroleum
gas industries. The growth rate increased
government expenditures and private
economic activity greatly. The GNP growth
rates for the years since the 1960s were always
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pro portiona l to rates o f oi l exports, o il prices,
and government expenditures.
A st udy of income distri bution in Kuwa it
is almost im possib le because no fina ncial or
mo netary records exist. Peop le of Kuwa it pay
neither perso nal income tax nor taxes o n
capital gains. Import duties are low, and imported goods are sometimes underreported in
order to reduce import d uties. The only co mpanies whic h pay taxes are the oil companies,
and they are most ly natio nalized.
In 1959, the United Nations attempted to
measure the GNP of Kuwait. The GNP was
meas ured at over $105 million or about $3,000
per capita (A l-Sabah 1980, p. 83). A second
measuremen t attempt was made in 1963, and
the G NP was $132 million or about $2,960 per
capita (Al-Sabah 1980, p. 83 ). T hese estimates
of G NP excl uded retai ned profi ts and foreign
exc hange expenditure o f the fo reign oi l compan ies. T he decline in per capita income between 195 9 a nd 1963 was attri buted to the
mass ive influx o f people into the co untry
which, in effect, reduced the oil revenues per
capita from $1,600 in 1959 to $1 ,400 in 1963.
From 1970 to 1977, GNP rose consistently, due
to the increase in oil and gas prices, to the extent that increases in population had no effec t on the level of GNP per capita. In 1977
the G NP was in excess of $1.15 billion or
$14,000 per capita (AI-Sabah 1980, p. 84). In
the years since 1977, the GNP per capita has
fallen because of falling oil and gas prices. The
stand ard of living has been affected only
sligh tly, however, due to the massive cash
reserves Kuwait has accumulated.
In the period 1965-71 , the value of expendit ures in the oil sector greatly outweighed the
value of expenditures in the non -oil sector.
T he oil sector held 63.4 percent of the GDP
in the period 1965-6 and it increased its position to 70 percent in the period 1970-1 due to
the increase in oil and gas prices (Al-Sabah
1980, p. 84). These figures disclose the
dualistic nature of the economy and make it
obvio us that Kuwait depends on the export of
crude oil. The bulk of the non-oi l sector lies
in public administration and wholesale and
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retail t rade. T hese sectors, however, are linked
closely with the oil sector. The true non-oil secto rs are the industrial, and the fi nance, insura nce, and real estate sectors.
The in dustrial sector of the economy made
a larger contribution to G DP during 1966-7
than d uring previous years, even though the
domestic market was small and other non-oil
national resources were scarce (Al-Sabah 1980,
p. 85) . The nu m b er of industrial
estab lishments increased from 995 in 1965 to
1,549 in 1974. Proportionally t he number of
industrial workers rose from 10,155 in 1965 to
16,733 in 1974 (Al-Sabah 1980, p. 85). The
value of industrial prod uction increased from
$10 million in 1965 to over $35 million in 1974,
a nd the value added rose fro m $500,000 to
almost $13 mi llion (A l-Sabah 1980, p. 86).
Altho ugh non-oi l indu stries have been trying
to th rive in Kuwait si nce the ear ly sixties, it
mu st be realized that the country has become
just a fin ishing plant for consumer goods. This
processing depends o n imported capital,
materials, a nd intermediate goods. Kuwai t's
paint indu stry, for exa mple, is wh o lly importbased. T he onl y process that takes place in
Kuwait is the mixing of the paint. Kuwait 's
metal, bu ilding, and food and beverage industries are almost wholly imported. A large
volume o f domestic furniture is produced in
Kuwait, but again all the materials are imported. Kuwaiti factories only put the parts
together. In truth, Kuwait's industrial sector,
excluding the oil industry, is hardly a goods
producing sector but rather a series of importing agencies.
Kuwait's finance, insurance and real estate
sector contrib uted 0.8 percent to GDP in
1955-6, and the contribution rose to 5 percent
in 1976 (Al-Sabah 1980, p. 87). This was due
to the influx of new companies and banks.
The assets of commercial banks increased
from over $135 million in 1973 to $1.80 billion
in 1977 (AI-Sabah 1980, p. 87). The commercial bank s were mainly concerned with trade
and import financing, while the financial services companies were concerned mostly with
personal loans for real estate purchases and
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speculation. Before 1965 there were no real
estate or in surance companies in Ku wait, but
by 1977 there were over 40 such companies
whose assets were almost $115 million (AISabah 1980, p. 88). It is notable that the most
successful entrepreneurs in Kuwait have been
working in two sub-sectors: (1) industry and
(2) finance, insurance and real estate.
Another aspect of Kuwait's dualism lies in
the manpower sector of the economy. In 1959
more than 75 percent of the labor force consisted of non-Kuwaitis, who earned higher
wages and salaries than the Kuwaiti workers.
Since that time, in the oil sector of the
economy, their wages and salaries have remained higher than those of the Kuwaitis. This
is due to the fact that American and European
technicians who are employed in the oil sector ususally have higher salaries because of
their expertise. In the non-oil secto rs,
foreigners have not done as well. As of 1974,
the average a nnual income for the entire nonKuwaiti labor force was $618 whereas the
average annu al income for Kuwaiti workers
was $1496 (AI-Sabah 1980, p. 93). In the
fishing industry, for example, in 1974, average
earnings were $237 a year for non-Kuwaitis
and $1,658 a year for Kuwaitis (Al-Sabah 1980,
p. 93). In the food manufacturing sector, the
non-Kuwaiti annual average income was $282
while the Kuwaiti annual average income was
$1070 (AI-Sabah 1980, p. 93). The effect of the
oil boom has been to raise the standard of living of Kuwaitis at the expense of low-wage immigrants in the non-oil sector.

Surpluses and Gaps
In Kuwait there are three main surpluses and
gaps. The first gap, between government
revenue a nd government expen diture, has
resulted in a surplus almost every year. The
highest do mestic surplus in post-oil Kuwait
was $563 million (net of public expend iture)
in 1976 (Al-Sabah 1980, p. 95). This resulted
from rising oil prices and the government
takeover of the Kuwait Oil Compa ny. The second gap is the internatio nal trade balance,
where there is always a surplus in the balance

of payments. Kuwait 's balance of payments
has been consistently in surplus since 1960.
The 1977 surplus of over $74 million was
realized because of the increase in foreig n
reserves, created by previo us foreign investments. The balance of payment surpluses
has come from the enormous revenu e
generated by the oil industry, provi ng once
again that Kuwait lives and dies by the oil well.
The last gap is between savings and investment, where a high percentage of GN P is saved, and half of the amount is invested
domestically (AI-Sabah 1980, p. 94). National
saving had increased by 1.82 percent per year
until 1971 when saving began to increase by
leaps and bounds (Al-Sabah 1980, p. 99). National saving increased from $63 million in
1970-71 to over $8 billion in 1975-6 (Al-Sabah
1980, p. 99). T his massive j ump can be attributed to the increase of oi l and liquid gas
prices. At the end of 1976, natio nal saving
represented 61.2 percent of the GDP, one ofthe highest percentages in the world (Al-Sabah
1980, p. 99). T he rate of increase in the purchase of invisible foreign assets was even more
dramatic than the increase in national investment in that same period. National investment
increased from $50 million in 1970-1 to almost
$553 million in 1975-6 (Al-Sabah 1980, p. 99).

Kuwait's Role in OPEC
Kuwait, though a small country compared
to other members o f the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Cou ntries (OPEC), is a
mighty producer. Kuwait uses a higher percentage of its fla red gas than any other member
of OPEC. Kuwait also refines more oil,
percentage-wise, than any other Gulf state
(Rouhani 197 1, p. 71). Kuwait 's economic
policies, however, are not clearly defined, and
there seems to be a lack of central planning
geared to a well-defi ned obj ective. Furthermore, Kuwait is not in full control of its oil
resources. The Ministry of Oil, the Kuwait Oil
Co mp any (KOC), the Kuwait National
P etro leum
Company (K N I C),
a nd
Petrochemical Industries Company (KNPC)
comprise the oil sector of Kuwait. The Kuwaiti
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gove rnment owns 60 percent of the shares of
stoc k and the other 40 percent is owned by
Kuwaiti nationals (Al-Sabah 1980, p. 37).
T he KOC, the Arabian Oil Company, and
the American Independent Oil Company are
the three foreign oi l companies operating in
Kuwait. KOC, the principle producing company in Kuwait, is owned equally by British
Petroleum and Gulf Oil. Arabian Oil Company (AOC) is owned principally by Japanese
firms; however, 20 percent of the company's
shares are owned by the Kuwaiti government
(Al-Sabah 1980, p. 42). The AOC operates
solely off shore in the neutral zone shared by
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The American Independent Oil Company (Aminoi l) is owned
solely by American firms. In 1973 Kuwait was
in fo urth place in the production of oil, producing 3.01 million barrels per day fo r an annual revenue of $203 million (AI-Sabah 1980,
p. 53).
Since 1973 the price of a barrel of oil has
pl ummeted, and OPEC has had to establish
production quotas. Kuwait's major strategy in
OPEC has been to get a better market share,
while Saudi Arabia has been trying to play
peacema ker between Libya, Kuwait and the
rest of the OPEC countries. The Saudis have
been will ing to give Kuwait part of their productio n quota in hopes of keeping OPEC
toget her. The Saudis believe a strong OPEC
will restore profits.

Conclusion
Kuwait started out as a poor country whose
main national income derived from pearl div-
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ing and fishing. Since the pre-oil era, many
changes have taken place. Black gold, oil, was
found and plenty of it! Since the oil strike,
billions of dollars have been made in revenues,
a nd the standard of living, for Kuwaitis at
least, has skyrocketed . Per capita GNP has
soared, and Kuwait's cash reserves have
become enormous. However, all good things
must come to an end. In 1980 there was a crash
of oil prices, and Kuwait's reserves started to
dwindle. The oil crash of 1980 taught Kuwait
a lesson that goes like this, "Don't put all your
eggs in one basket;' Kuwait was so duali stic
that it lived and died by the oi l well. When oil
prices were high, the economy was in good
shape; when crude prices fe ll , the opposite
became true. Kuwait should learn the basic
principle of finance that one must diversify to
spread the risk.
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